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Pepe and Brenner: Patent Venue in the Internet Age

IMPLICATIONS OF A REVITALIZED 28 U.S.C. § 1400(B):
IDENTIFYING THE “REGULAR AND ESTABLISHED PLACE
OF BUSINESS” FOR PATENT VENUE IN THE INTERNET AGE
By Steven Pepe and Samuel Brenner *
I.

INTRODUCTION

On May 22, 2017, the United States Supreme Court handed
down its decision in TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Group Brands
LLC,1 a case that likely will alter significantly how and where patent
infringement cases can be brought in U.S. district courts. The specific
issue in TC Heartland was whether venue in patent actions is
controlled solely by the special patent venue statute, 28 U.S.C. §
1400(b), or whether venue in patent actions is also informed by the
general venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1391. 2 Since the Federal Circuit’s
1990 decision in VE Holding Corp. v. Johnson Gas Appliance Co., 3
patent holders have been permitted to rely on the general venue statute
and, as a result, have been permitted to bring patent infringement
actions in any district in which the court has personal jurisdiction over
the defendants. 4 This has resulted in the development of a number of
patent-friendly jurisdictions and, accordingly, what observers view as
a form of blatant forum shopping by patent holders when bringing
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1 TC Heartland LLC v, Kraft Foods Group Brands LLC, No. 16-341, —S. Ct. — (2017).
2 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, TC Heartland LLC, 2016 WL 4983136, at *1 (U.S. 2016)
(No. 16-341).
3 917 F.2d 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
4 See id. at 1583.
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patent cases. 5 In TC Heartland, the Supreme Court unanimously6
rejected the Federal Circuit’s holding in VE Holding, 7 thus making it
clear that venue in patent cases is governed solely by the restrictive
language of 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b), which states: “Any civil action for
patent infringement may be brought in the judicial district where the
defendant resides, or where the defendant has committed acts of
infringement and has a regular and established place of business.” 8
Now that TC Heartland has prevailed, the sort of blatant forum
shopping criticized by observers will likely be minimized.
Even before oral argument, a great deal had already been
written on the merits of TC Heartland’s argument, both by
commentators and interested parties. 9 Indeed, in addition to the merits
brief filed by TC Heartland, by February 6, 2017, nineteen separate
groups of amici had already filed briefs. 10 To most of these
5

See, e.g., Brief for the State of Texas et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 7-15,
TC Heartland LLC, 137 S. Ct. 614 (2016) (No. 16-341) [hereinafter Brief for the State of
Texas et al.].
6 Justice Gorsuch, who joined the Supreme Court after oral argument, took no part in the
consideration or decision of the case. TC Heartland, Slip. Op. at 10.
7 See, e.g., TC Heartland, Slip. Op. at 1 (“We therefore hold that a domestic corporation
‘resides’ only in its State of incorporation for purposes of the patent venue statute.”); id. at 78.
8 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) (1999) (emphasis added).
9 See, e.g., Paul R. Gugliuzza & Megan M. La Belle, The Patently Unexceptional Venue
Statute, 66 AM. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract = 2914091; Dennis
Crouch, TC Heartland: Statutory Interpretation, Fairness, and E.D. Texas, PATENTLYO (Feb.
7,
2017),
https://patentlyo.com/patent/
2017/02/heartland-statutory-interpretationfairness.html; Rebecca Kaufman & Abby Parsons, TC Heartland v. Kraft: Awaiting a 2017
Supreme Court Decision with Potentially Significant Implications for Patent Litigation,
JDSUPRA (Feb. 6, 2017), http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/tc-heartland-v-kraft-awaiting-a2017-39309/; Megan M. La Belle & Paul R. Gugliuzza, In Defense of the Federal Circuit: TC
(Feb.
16,
2017),
Heartland
and
Patent
Venue,
PATENTLYO
https://patentlyo.com/patent/2017/02/federal-circuit-heartland.html; Michael Risch, Guest
Post: TC Heartland and Statutory Interpretation, PATENTLYO (Dec. 28, 2016),
https://patentlyo.com/patent/2016/12/heartland-statutory-interpretation.html.
10 Among those are briefs filed by 61 law and economics professors (drafted by Mark Lemley
at Stanford Law School); the Intellectual Property Law Association of Chicago; General
Electric; the Electronic Frontier Foundation; the American Bar Association; and the states of
Texas, Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Michigan,
Nebraska, North Carolina, Ohio, South Carolina, Vermont, Virginia, and Wisconsin. See
generally Brief of the A.B.A. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, TC Heartland LLC,
137 S. Ct. 614 (2016) (No. 16–341); Brief of the Electronic Frontier Found. & Pub.
Knowledge as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, TC Heartland LLC, 137 S. Ct. 614
(2016) (No. 16–341); Brief of Gen. Elec. Co. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Neither Party, TC
Heartland LLC, 137 S. Ct. 614 (2016) (No. 16-341); Brief of the Intellectual Prop. Law Ass’n
of Chicago as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Petitioner or Respondent, TC Heartland
LLC, 137 S. Ct. 614 (2016) (No. 16-341); Brief of Amici Curiae 61 Professors of Law and
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commentators, it seems likely that the Supreme Court would accept at
least part of TC Heartland’s argument and issue a decision that
significantly constrained where patent holders can sue alleged patent
infringers. 11 While there was some dispute after oral argument
regarding which way the Court was leaning, 12 in the end the Court, as
expected, decisively reversed the Federal Circuit. 13 This decision
likely represents a sea change in the law—in one fell swoop, the Court
overruled almost three decades of patent litigation precedent and
practice, dating back to VE Holding. In the process, the Court
necessarily made it much more difficult for patent holders to sue in the
Eastern District of Texas, a district that is perceived by many as being
patentee-friendly 14 and that was the location of 44% of all patent cases
filed in 2015. 15 The fact that patent holders gravitate to the Eastern
District of Texas comes as no surprise — as compared to other
districts, the Eastern District of Texas generally has seen higher
median damages awards, lower transfer rates of patent cases, lower
stay rates pending Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) proceedings,
lower rates of summary judgment of non-infringement and invalidity,
and lower rates of dismissing cases based on non-patentable subject
matter than have many other districts. 16
Unless Congress steps in to maintain the status quo in a new
patent venue statute, this decision by the Supreme Court overruling VE
Holding obviously has significant implications for patent
litigators. One of the effects of this decision is to raise once again what
had been a key and thorny question implicated by the special patent
Econ. in Support of Petitioner, TC Heartland LLC, 137 S. Ct. 614 (2016) (No. 16-341); Brief
for the State of Texas et al., supra note 5, at 7-15.
11 Steven Pollinger & Yusuf Rangwala, Much More Than East Texas Is At Stake In TC
Heartland, LAW360 (Feb. 9, 2017, 11:41 AM), https://www.law360.com/ articles/889785/
much-more-than-east-texas-is-at-stake-in-tc-heartland-; Gene Quinn, Supreme Court Agrees
(Dec.
to Hear Patent Venue Case Filled with Patent Reform Implications, IPWATCHDOG
14, 2016), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2016/12/14/supreme-court-patent-venue-case-patentreform-implications/id=75751/.
12 See, e.g., Dennis Crouch, “TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Oral Arguments,” Apr. 2,
2017, www.patentlyo.com, at https://patentlyo.com/ patent/2017/04/heartland-kraftarguments.html; Daniel Fisher, “Supreme Court Seems Unenthusiastic About Eliminating
Patent-Troll Venue,” Forbes, Mar. 28, 2017.
13 See, e.g., TC Heartland, Slip. Op. at 7-8.
14 See, e.g., Brief for the State of Texas et al., supra note 5, at 7-15.
15 Lisa Schuchman, Eastern Texas Had an ‘Astounding’ Number of Patent Cases in 2015,
CORP. COUNS. (Jan. 7, 2016), http://www.corpcounsel.com /id=1202746460787/EasternTexas-Had-an-Astounding-Number-of-Patent-Cases-in-2015.
16 Brian J. Love & James Yoon, Predictably Expensive: A Critical Look at Patent Litigation
in the Eastern District of Texas, 20 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, 5, 16-18 (2017).
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venue statute: what, exactly, is meant by a “regular and established
place of business” as that term is used in 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b)? 17 As
one district court noted in 1986 (just four years before VE Holding),
“[t]he case law development of this issue encompasses a wide variety
of opinions as to the type and extent of contacts that signify a regular
and established place of business. Indeed, the courts have reached
opposite conclusions in substantially similar cases.” 18 And as another
court observed, “[i]t is true that no reliable test has been devised by
which a court can determine whether or not a foreign corporation
maintains a regular and established place of business within any certain
District.” 19 Instead, the courts are required to analyze the factual
pattern of each individual case. 20 In fact, before the Federal Circuit in
VE Holding made this question irrelevant, there was extensive case
law, both at the district court level and at the various circuits,
addressing this exact question and exhaustively considering individual
fact patterns. 21 One leading treatise suggested that many of the close
cases generally fall into four regularly recurring patterns: the
“Traveling Salesman Cases,” the “Sales Office Cases,” the
“Independent Sales Representative Cases,” and the “Parent and
Subsidiary Corporations—Separate Divisions” Cases.” 22 Courts
deciding what constituted a regular and established place of business
routinely applied the law to these recurring fact patterns, analogized to
similar cases to reach decisions, or considered factors that had proven
relevant in cases arising in this context. 23 Now that the Court in its TC
Heartland decision has overruled VE Holding, these cases are
presumably once again both relevant and possibly binding, after a
thirty-year hiatus.

17

Pollinger & Rangwala, supra note 11.
OMI Int’l Corp. v. MacDermid, Inc., 648 F. Supp. 1012, 1015 (M.D.N.C. 1986); see also
Jean F. Rydstrom, Annotation, What Constitutes “Regular and Established Place of Business”
Within Meaning of 28 U.S.C.A. § 1400(b) Fixing Venue in Actions for Patent Infringement, 12
A.L.R. Fed. 502, § 9[a] (1972) (“The decision in any case depends upon the factual pattern of
that particular case, and whether a defendant’s activities within a district are sufficient to
justify its subjection to suit in that district is a question of fact.”).
19 Up-Right, Inc. v. Aluminum Safety Prod., Inc., 165 F. Supp. 742, 744 (D. Minn. 1958).
20 See generally id.
21 See, e.g., Rydstrom, supra note 18, at § 1[a] (“This annotation collects the cases which have
construed and applied to particular factual situations the words ‘a regular and established place
of business’ as appearing in 28 U.S.C.A. § 1400(b) . . . .”).
22 See 8 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 21.02[2] (Matthew Bender ed., 2011).
23 See, e.g., Dual Mfg. & Eng’g, Inc. v. Burris Indus., Inc., 531 F.2d 1382, 1387 (7th Cir. 1976)
(“The facts relevant to venue in the present case are very close to the facts in Shelton.”).
18
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But in today’s high-tech world, there could be problems with
dusting off and relying upon long-dormant law regarding what
constitutes a “regular and established place of business.” Because the
world has changed in significant ways since the 1980s, not to mention
the 1920s, doing so might lead to improper results. As the Supreme
Court recently observed in the Fourth Amendment context in ruling
that a search incident to arrest cannot include warrantless searches of
the data on smartphones, such modern devices “are based on
technology nearly inconceivable just a few decades ago . . . .” 24 It
seems likely that, outside of the realm of science fiction, the business
people of the 1920s-1980s could not have imagined the technologydriven world of Amazon, eBay, and Uber, and the power of a personal
computer and smartphone to reach nearly any business in the United
States with a web presence with just a few keystrokes. 25 Given these
differences, and that business in the Internet age is simply conducted
today in a different way than it was in the pre-VE Holding period, it is
not clear how much of the pre-VE Holding law on what constitutes a
regular and established place of business should remain good law with
respect to fact patterns that were not contemplated by these cases. Put
another way: by trying to apply law that is at least three decades old to
very different real-world circumstances, courts will likely be reading
far more into 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) than Congress ever conceived of or
intended. And doing so without some better signal from Congress
would inappropriately broaden the explicitly limited language of §
1400(b). 26
24

Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2484 (2014).
Cf. Kerr v. Port Huron Sulphite & Paper Co., 157 F. Supp. 685, 686 (D.N.J. 1957) (noting,
in 1957, that the law of personal jurisdiction was required to change in light of “the growth in
the last quarter of a century in both the size and complexity of modern American business and
its methods . . . .”).
26
The challenges posed by applying older law to vastly changed technological circumstances
have been recognized by both commentators and courts in non-patent contexts. See, e.g., The
Honorable M. Margaret McKeown, The Internet and the Constitution: A Selective
Retrospective, 9 WASH. J.L. TECH. & ARTS 135, 138 (2014) (noting that lawyers and scholars
report “the story of a system overwhelmed: by the rapid pace of technological changes; by
whole areas of doctrine, like the First Amendment, that are an uncomfortable fit with the
Internet; by legal regimes, like jurisdiction, that haven’t yet adapted to technologies that don’t
play by old rules or respect physical boundaries.”). Many courts have attempted to address
these challenges by developing balancing tests, or otherwise seeking to integrate
circumstances such as internet usage into more traditional legal concepts. For example, in the
context of personal jurisdiction, many courts have adopted the Zippo sliding-scale test, under
which “the likelihood that personal jurisdiction can be constitutionally exercised is directly
proportionate to the nature and quality of commercial activity that an entity conducts over the
Internet.” Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D. Penn.
25
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In this Article, we focus on the state of the law regarding what
constituted a regular and established place of business before VE
Holding made it irrelevant, and on how that law might apply in the
Internet Age. We argue that, while many pre-VE Holding cases
regarding what constitutes regular and established place of business
can apply in the Internet Age (especially where courts are looking at
traditional ways of doing business that have not changed in response
to technology), courts should be leery of attempting to analogize in all
cases between the standard ways of doing business in the 1940s-1980s
and the hyper-connected, Internet-driven ways of doing business of
today. In part by using four recurring fact patterns of cases identified
by an established patent law treatise, Chisum on Patents, and in part
by examining what factors courts considered in “regular and
established place of business” cases, we examine which aspects of preVE Holding business could best lend themselves to reasoning-byanalogy, and what sorts of cases that might arise today more readily
fall outside any of those fact patterns, or even outside the general
governing principles that can be distilled from the earlier cases.
We conclude that, while it can be tempting for courts to look to
what has been said in the law previously, in deciding what constitutes
a regular and established place of business in the age of Google,
Facebook, Uber, eBay, and Amazon, courts may in some
circumstances be better served by refusing to analogize new
technologies to the fact patterns in past decisions, and even refusing to
expand existing general § 1400(b) principles to novel technological
circumstances, and instead reading § 1400(b) narrowly until and unless
Congress indicates how and whether patent venue should be expanded
to accommodate what is truly a different world than Congress could
have imagined. And, finally, we conclude that, regardless of what
happened in TC Heartland itself, and regardless of whether the specific
test for what constitutes a regular and established place of business
once again becomes a critical question for courts, this case study
demonstrates a broader principle: that, even in a legal system
generally governed by precedent, relying on cases that are many
1997). Nonetheless, other courts, including the Ninth Circuit, have urged caution in using this
sort of test, suggesting that it improperly extends prior case law. See Boschetto v. Hansing,
539 F.3d 1011, 1019 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that there was no personal jurisdiction in
California where a California plaintiff purchased a car from a Wisconsin seller over eBay and
noting that “[t]he Supreme Court has, in the past, sounded a note of caution that traditional
jurisdictional analyses are not upended simply because a case involves technological
developments that make it easier for parties to reach across state lines.”).
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decades old in a rapidly changing world presents challenges and
concerns that courts should at least consider before doing so.
II.

THE VENUE STATUTES: 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391(C) AND 1400(B)

The question presented in TC Heartland requires an
understanding of what the special venue patent statute of 28 U.S.C. §
1400(b) and the general venue statute of 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (and, more
specifically, § 1391(c)) say, and how they interact. As discussed
below, between the 1950s and today the general venue statute has been
amended multiple times; 27 the import of those amendments, as seen by
the Federal Circuit’s VE Holding decision, 28 is unclear, and is what
made the TC Heartland case complicated. Regardless, the overarching
statutory framework for patent venue and the applicable case law are
fairly straightforward.
a. The Special Patent Venue Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b)
The special patent venue statute is laid out in 28 U.S.C. §
1400(b), which states, “Any civil action for patent infringement may
be brought in the judicial district where the defendant resides, or where
the defendant has committed acts of infringement and has a regular and
established place of business.” 29
In 1957, the Supreme Court in Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra
Products Corporation30 held that this special patent venue statute “is
the sole and exclusive provision controlling venue in patent
infringement actions, and that it is not to be supplemented by the
provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c).” 31 The Fourco Glass Court also
concluded that, as applied to corporate entities, the phrase “where the
defendant resides” in 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b), “mean[s] the state of
incorporation only.” 32 Thus, under § 1400(b), a patent plaintiff could
only bring a patent litigation where either: (1) the defendant is
incorporated; or (2) the defendant has committed acts of infringement
and has a regular and established place of business. 33
27

28 U.S.C. § 1400(b).
VE Holding Corp. v. Johnson Gas Appliance Co., 917 F.2d 1574, 1584 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
29 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b).
30 353 U.S. 222, 229 (1957).
31 Id. at 229.
32 Id. at 226.
33
Id. at 225; see also In re Cordis Corp., 769 F.2d 733, 735 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
28
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b. The General Venue Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1391
In contrast to the special patent venue statute, 28 U.S.C. §
1400(b), the general venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c), (arguably)
covers venue in all cases not governed by special venue provisions. 34
Where, under the Fourco Glass reading, the concept of “resides” under
§ 1400(b) turned on where a defendant was incorporated, under the
general venue statute (in all of its amendments), a defendant “resides”
anywhere the court has personal jurisdiction.35
At the time of Fourco Glass, § 1391(c) read, “A corporation
may be sued in any judicial district in which it is incorporated or
licensed to do business or is doing business, and such judicial district
shall be regarded as the residence of such corporation for venue
purposes.” 36
Importantly for the development of the law of patent venue, at
least in the eyes of the Federal Circuit in VE Holding, in 1988,
Congress amended § 1391(c) to read: “For purposes of venue under
this chapter [§§ 1391 - 1408], a defendant that is a corporation shall be
deemed to reside in any judicial district in which it is subject to
personal jurisdiction at the time the action is commenced.” 37
This amendment is important in two respects. First, it
expanded the definition of corporate residence from any district in
which a corporation was incorporated, licensed to do business, or
actually doing business to any district in which a corporation was
subject to personal jurisdiction.38 And second, it changed the
somewhat vague language for venue purpose to for purposes of venue
under this chapter. This somewhat insignificant change in language
played a significant role in the Federal Circuit’s VE Holding case.
In 2011, Congress again amended § 1391, so that it now reads
in part:
For all venue purposes . . . an entity with the capacity
to sue and be sued in its common name under applicable
law, whether or not incorporated, shall be deemed to
reside, if a defendant, in any judicial district in which
such defendant is subject to the court’s personal
34

28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (2011); id. at § 1400(b).
Fourco Glass, 353 U.S. at 226; see, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c).
36 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (1958) (emphasis added).
37 Id. (emphasis added).
38 See id. at § 1391(c) (2011).
35
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jurisdiction with respect to the civil action in question
and, if a plaintiff, only in the judicial district in which
it maintains its principal place of business. 39
c. Broadening Patent Venue: VE Holding Corp. v.
Johnson Gas Appliance Co.
The critical shift from the Fourco Glass reading of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1400(b) as being the “sole and exclusive provision controlling venue
in patent infringement actions” that was “not to be supplemented by
the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c),” 40 came in the Federal Circuit’s
decision 1990 decision in VE Holding Corp. v. Johnson Gas Appliance
Co. 41 In that case, the court, hearing consolidated appeals in which the
Northern District of California had twice dismissed patent actions for
improper venue, concluded that the 1988 amendments to § 1391
discussed above had so changed the law of venue that the Supreme
Court’s Fourco Glass decision no longer constituted precedent in
applying §§ 1400(b) and 1391(c). 42 Thus, the court concluded, the
issue was not what the Supreme Court had previously decided, but
rather “what, as a matter of first impression, should we conclude the
Congress now intends by this new language in the venue act.” 43
In reaching its decision on this question, the Federal Circuit
first decided that Congress’s 1988 amendment (i.e., for venue purpose
to for purposes of venue under this chapter) so changed the meaning
of §1391(c) as to require §§ 1400(b) and 1391(c) to be read together—
exactly the argument the Supreme Court in Fourco Glass had rejected
under what the Federal Circuit viewed as the old, nonspecific language
of the pre-1988 § 1391(c). 44 “Congress,” the court concluded, “by its
1988 amendment of 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) meant what it said; the
meaning of the term ‘resides’ in § 1400(b) has changed.” 45 Under this
new meaning of “resides,” then, “the first test for venue under §
1400(b) with respect to a defendant that is a corporation . . . is whether

39

See id. at § 1391(c)(2) (emphasis added).
See id. at § 1391(c); 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b); Fourco Glass, 353 U.S. at 229.
41 917 F.2d at 1575-76 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
42 Id. at 1579.
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 Id. at 1575–76.
40
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the defendant was subject to personal jurisdiction in the district of suit
at the time the action was commenced.” 46
Of course, with such a broad first test—that venue in patent
cases was appropriate in any district where the court merely had
personal jurisdiction over the defendant—there was no longer any
need for the second test at all. After 1990 it was thus no longer
necessary for courts to ask and consider exactly what constituted a
regular and established place of business, within the meaning of §
1400(b). And so, as a result of VE Holding, the voluminous case law
on that question fell into disuse, and, critically, no longer developed in
light of ongoing technological changes in, and the digital and
computing revolution of, the 1990s and 2000s.
III.

CHALLENGING THE RULE OF VE HOLDING:
TC HEARTLAND V. KRAFT

For decades following the Federal Circuit’s decision in VE
Holding, parties litigating before the district courts generally accepted
the Federal Circuit’s broadening of venue for patent infringement
actions. 47 In recent years, however, defendants have increasingly
focused on the argument that VE Holding was wrongly decided, or at
least that patent venue should be more narrowly construed in
accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b). 48 TC Heartland itself arose
from such a circumstance. Kraft sued TC Heartland, an Indiana
company, in Delaware, alleging that TC Heartland’s liquid water
enhancer products, which were shipped into Delaware, infringe Kraft
patents. 49 TC Heartland, which argued that it had no local presence in
Delaware, moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(2) for lack of personal jurisdiction, or alternatively to transfer
venue to the Southern District of Illinois. 50 In particular, TC Heartland
argued that Congress’s 2011 amendments to 28 U.S.C. § 1391 nullified
the Federal Circuit’s decision in VE Holding, just as the Federal Circuit
in VE Holding had said that the 2008 amendments to § 1391 had
46

VE Holding Corp., 917 F.2d at 1584.
Mosaid Techs. v. Sony Ericsson Mobile Commc’n (USA), Inc., 885 F. Supp. 2d 720 (D.
Del. 2012); Big Baby Co. v. Schecter, 812 F. Supp. 442 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); Kinetic Instruments,
Inc. v. Lares, 802 F. Supp. 976 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
48 DUSA Pharm., Inc. v. River’s Edge Pharm., LLC, 2006 WL 1320049 (D.N.J. 2006).
49 See In re TC Heartland LLC, 821 F.3d 1338, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2016), cert. granted sub nom.
TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Food Brands Grp. LLC, 137 S. Ct. 614 (2016).
50 Id. at 1340.
47
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nullified the Supreme Court’s decision in Fourco Glass. 51 The district
court rejected TC Heartland’s arguments, and TC Heartland petitioned
the Federal Circuit for a writ of mandamus. 52 The Federal Circuit
denied the petition, concluding that the 2011 amendments to § 1391
had broadened rather than narrowed the “applica[tion] of the definition
of corporate residence” and therefore had not nullified VE Holding. 53
On September 12, 2016, TC Heartland petitioned for a writ of
certiorari from the Supreme Court. 54 In its petition, TC Heartland
largely abandoned the argument it had made before the Federal Circuit
regarding the 2011 amendments to 28 U.S.C. § 1391 and instead
argued that the Federal Circuit had erred in deciding VE Holding
because it was the Supreme Court’s “prerogative alone to overrule one
of its precedents.” 55 Critically, the question presented by TC
Heartland echoed the issue before the Supreme Court in Fourco Glass
and focused directly on Congress’s venue statute: “Whether 28 U.S.C.
§ 1400(b) is the sole and exclusive provision governing venue in patent
infringement actions and is not to be supplemented by 28 U.S.C. §
1391(c).” 56 Numerous amici, including former Federal Circuit Judge
Paul R. Michel, The Electronic Frontier Foundation, Dell, Inc., and
fifty-six Professors of Law and Economics (in a brief authored by
Mark Lemley of Stanford University) filed briefs urging the Court to
grant certiorari, which it did on December 14, 2016. 57
Although there were some outliers, 58 before oral argument
most commentators appeared to believe that TC Heartland would
succeed, at least in part, before the Supreme Court. 59 Numerous

51

Id. at 1340-41.
Id. at 1340.
53 Id. at 1341.
54 See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 2.
55 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 2, at 8 (quoting State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S.
3, 20 (1997)).
56 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 2, at i.
57 See generally Brief of the Elec. Frontier Found. & Pub. Knowledge as Amici Curiae in
Support of Petitioner, supra note 10; Brief of Dell Inc. and the Software & Info. Indus. Ass’n
as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, TC Heartland, LLC, 137 S. Ct. 614 (2016) (No. 16341); Brief of Amici Curiae 56 Professors of Law and Econ. in Support of Petition for Writ of
Certiorari, TC Heartland, LLC, 137 S. Ct. 614 (2016) (No. 16-341); Brief of Amicus Curiae
Paul R. Michel in Support of Petitioner, TC Heartland, LLC, 137 S. Ct. 614 (2016) (No. 16341); see also Supreme Court Docket, SUP. CT. U.S., https://www.supremecourt.gov/
search.aspx?filename=/docketfiles/16-341.htm (last visited Apr. 28, 2017).
58 See, e.g., Risch, supra note 9.
59 See, e.g., Gene Quinn, Hatch Says Patent Venue Reform Likely Regardless
of
(Feb.
16,
2017),
SCOTUS
Decision
in
TC
Heartland,
IPWATCHDOG
52
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influential amici filed briefs seeking to support TC Heartland’s
position.60 For example, seventeen attorney generals—including the
attorney general of Texas, the home of the Eastern District of Texas—
signed on to an amicus brief supporting TC Heartland and suggesting
that their citizens might face “abusive claims of patent infringement,
which businesses and residents confirm are a drag on economic
growth.” 61
On May 22, 2017, the Supreme Court proved the majority of
commentators correct when it unanimously overruled the Federal
Circuit in TC Heartland and in doing so soundly rejected the Federal
Circuit’s reasoning in VE Holding. 62 In the decision, Justice Thomas
writing for the Court reaffirmed that the Court had “definitively and
unambiguously” held in Fourco that “the word ‘reside[ence]’ in §
1400(b) has a particular meaning as applied to domestic corporations:
It refers only to the State of incorporation.” 63 Noting that Congress
had not subsequently amended § 1400(b) and that “neither party asks
us to reconsider our holding in [Fourco],” Justice Thomas concluded
that the only question before the Court was whether “Congress
changed the meaning of § 1400(b) when it amended § 1391.” 64 After
observing that the current version of § 1391 does not contain any
indication that Congress intended to amend § 1400(b), Justice Thomas
added that the Court did not see “any material difference” between the
various “for venue purposes” and “for all venue purposes” language of
different versions of § 1391. 65 Finally, Justice Thomas added that there
was no indication that Congress in 2011 ratified the Federal Circuit in
VE Holding—and, “[i]f anything, the 2011 amendments undermine
that decisions’ rationale.” 66 Summarizing the decision, Justice
Thomas explained that “[w]e therefore hold that a domestic
corporation ‘resides’ only in its State of incorporation for purposes of
the patent venue statute.” 67
The victory by TC Heartland will likely have drastic real-world
effects on patent litigation in the United States. A consequence of the
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2017/02/16/hatch-venue-reform-likely-scotus-tcheartland/id=78495/.
60 See Supreme Court Docket, supra note 57.
61 Brief for the State of Texas et al., supra note 5, at 1.
62 See, e.g., TC Heartland, Slip. Op. at 7-8.
63 Id.
64 Id. at 8.
65 Id. at 8-9.
66 Id. at 9.
67 Id. at 1.
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Supreme Court so drastically restricted the first (state of incorporation)
test of 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) will be to revive for courts the thorny, factintensive jurisdictional question under the second test of § 1400(b) of
what exactly constitutes a regular and established place of business
within the meaning of the statute.
IV.

PRE-VE HOLDING LAW ON “REGULAR AND ESTABLISHED
PLACE OF BUSINESS”

Before the Federal Circuit changed the law on patent venue in
VE Holding, allowing defendants to be sued in any district in which
the district court had personal jurisdiction,68 patent defendants could
only be sued where they were incorporated or where they had
committed acts of infringement and had regular and established
places of business. 69 If a patent holder sued a company in a district that
was not within the company’s state of incorporation, courts were
routinely required to address the question of whether that particular
defendant had a regular and established place of business in that
particular district.70 Courts generally approached this determination in
one of three ways: (1) by attempting to articulate a broad test and
returning to general, higher level governing principles regarding what
constitutes a regular and established place of business; (2) by
attempting to fit the facts before them into regularly recurring fact
patterns; or (3) by simply assessing various non-exhaustive factors that
courts had previously considered in other cases. 71Unsurprisingly, all
of these approaches occasionally resulted in courts reaching “opposite
conclusions in substantially similar cases,” 72 but courts did not or
could not create any more rigorous bright-line tests. 73
A. Governing Principles and Broad Tests
Even with the significant number of cases being decided in
contradictory ways, 74 it is still possible to identify some high-level
68

VE Holding Corp., 917 F.2d at 1576, 1578, 1584.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) (2012); Fourco Glass Co., 353 U.S. at 223, 226, 229.
70 See, e.g., Rydstrom, supra note 18, at § 2(e).
71 Rydstrom, supra note 18, at § 8.
72 OMI Int’l Corp., 648 F. Supp. at 1015.
73 See, e.g., Shelton v. Schwartz, 131 F.2d 805, 808 (7th Cir. 1942) (“Nor should the term ‘a
regular and established place of business’ be narrowed or limited in its construction. Why
should it be? The words do not necessitate nor warrant it.”).
74 OMI Int’l Corp., 648 F. Supp at 1015.
69
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governing principles useful in determining what constituted a regular
and established place of business. Indeed, as one treatise noted,
“[a]lthough no rule has been formulated to determine” whether a
regular and established place of business exists, “the courts in some
cases have attempted to state rather broad tests against which the
statutory requirement of ‘a regular and established place of business’
is to be measured.” 75 These tests generally focused on the same factors,
and were stated variously as, for example, whether the defendant: (1)
“had a regular establishment, maintained, controlled, and paid for by
it, within the district;” 76 (2) “was regularly engaged in carrying on a
substantial part of its ordinary business on a permanent basis within
the district, in a physical location over which it exercised some
measure of control;” 77 (3) “carried on a systematic, regular, and
continuous course of business activity, from a permanent location;” 78
(4) “was engaged in carrying on in a continuous manner a substantial
part of its ordinary business within the district;” 79 or (5) “had an
established place at which he conducted business, and that the business
was conducted with such a degree of regularity and permanence as to
compel the conclusion that the place was a regular and established
place of business.” 80 These governing principles or broad tests could
be particularly important as parties seek to understand what a ruling in
TC Heartland might mean in the Internet Age, and courts seek to once
again apply § 1400(b) in the modern context.
75

Rydstrom, supra note 18, at § 8.
Rydstrom, supra note 18, at § 8 (citing Mastantuono v. Jacobsen Mfg. Co., 184 F. Supp.
178, 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) (“Something more is required. It must appear that a defendant is
regularly engaged in carrying on a substantial part of its ordinary business on a permanent
basis in a physical location within the district over which it exercised some measure of
control.”); Fed. Elec. Prods. Co. v. Frank Adam Elec. Co., 100 F. Supp. 8 (S.D.N.Y. 1951);
Patent Royalties Corp. v Land O’Lakes Creameries, Inc., 11 F. Supp. 103 (E.D.N.Y. 1935));
see also Shelton, 131 F.2d at 808.
77 Rydstrom, supra note 18, at § 8 (citing Faberge, Inc. v. Schick Elec., Inc., 312 F. Supp. 559
(D. Del. 1970); Rains v. Cascade Indus., Inc., 258 F. Supp. 974 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); Coleco
Indus., Inc. v. Kransco Mfg., Inc., 247 F. Supp. 571 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); Clearasite Headwear,
Inc. v. Paramount Cap Mfg. Co., 204 F. Supp. 4 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); Brevel Prods. Corp. v. H &
B Am. Corp., 202 F. Supp. 824 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); Mastantuono, 184 F. Supp. 178).
78 Rydstrom, supra note 18, at § 8 (citing Watsco, Inc. v. Henry Valve Co., 232 F. Supp. 38,
47 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) (“There has been a sufficient showing of a systematic, regular and
continuous course of business activity carried on from a permanent location in New York City
to constitute a ‘regular and established place of business’ of the defendant.”).
79 Rydstrom, supra note 18, at § 8 (citing Phillips v. Baker, 121 F.2d 752 (9th Cir. 1941), cert.
denied, 314 U.S. 688 (1941)).
76

80

Rydstrom, supra note 18, at § 8 (citing Railex Corp. v. White Mach. Co., 243 F.
Supp. 381 (E.D.N.Y. 1965).
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Though it is over thirty years old, simply because it is the most
recent Federal Circuit case on the meaning of regular and established
place of business, the Federal Circuit’s 1985 decision in In re Cordis
Corp. 81 is informative and provides a framework for the questions
courts should be asking in assessing venue determinations in the
Internet Age and how these general principles might be applied going
forward. 82 In Cordis Corp., Medtronic, a Minnesota company, sued
Cordis Corporation in the District of Minnesota for patent
infringement for selling cardiac pacemakers in Minnesota. 83Cordis
moved to dismiss, challenging venue on the ground that it did “not
have a regular and established place of business in the district of
Minnesota.” 84 The district court denied the motion, and Cordis
petitioned the Federal Circuit for a writ of mandamus. 85 The Federal
Circuit denied the petition, ruling that venue was appropriate in the
District of Minnesota. 86 In its analysis, the Federal Circuit
acknowledged the facts found by the district court demonstrating that
Cordis did not have a strong connection with Minnesota, including that
Cordis, a Florida corporation, was not registered to do business in
Minnesota, did not have a bank account in Minnesota, and did not own
or lease any property within the state. 87 But to market its pacemakers
in Minnesota, Cordis employed two full-time sales representatives,
who worked from offices they maintained in their homes, where they
stored Cordis literature, documents, and products. 88 These sales
representatives provided doctors with pacemakers for individual
surgeries, and acted as technical consultants, actually joining the
surgeons in the operating rooms during implantations of the
pacemakers. 89 Cordis also “engaged a secretarial service in Minnesota,
named ‘I Got It Secretarial,’ to receive messages, provide typing
services, mail Cordis literature and receive shipments of Cordis sales
literature.” 90 Cordis’s sales representatives carried business cards
listing the telephone number answered by that secretarial service;
81

In re Cordis Corp., 769 F.2d 733.
See, e.g., id.
83
Id. at 734.
84
Id.
85
Id
86
In re Cordis Corp., 769 F.2d at 734.
87
Id. at 735.
88
Id.
89
Id.
90
Id.
82
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phone calls to the number on these business cars were answered
“Cordis Corporation.” 91 Cordis’s name and telephone number was
listed in the Minneapolis telephone directory at the address of “I Got
It Secretarial.” 92
In denying the petition and finding venue in Minnesota
appropriate, the Federal Circuit explicitly addressed a Ninth Circuit
case, Phillips v. Baker, 93and a Seventh Circuit case, University of
Illinois Foundation v. Channel Master, 94relied on by Cordis. 95 In
Phillips, the court observed, at issue was whether venue was proper in
California for a Florida corporation,
which provided a seasonal pre-cooling operation for
grain shippers which was conducted by means of a fully
transportable apparatus which was assembled at each
location, kept in place until the procedure was
performed and then dismantled for conveyance to the
next location either within or without the jurisdiction. 96
Thus, in Phillips, the company’s presence within the district “was
merely temporary, and there was no way to contact its representatives
except by communication with the home office in Florida.” 97
In Channel Master, at issue was whether venue was appropriate
in Illinois in a suit against a New York manufacturer of television
antennas where Channel Master’s “sole employee worked from his
home in Illinois promoting sales of his employer’s products,” but did
not keep stock there, and all orders from customers “were accepted in
the New York home office, all shipments were made from the home
office to customers and all payments by customers were made to that
office.” 98 Ultimately, the Federal Circuit observed, these cases stand
for the proposition that,
in determining whether a corporate defendant has a
regular and established place of business in a district,
the appropriate inquiry is whether the corporate
91

In re Cordis Corp., 769 F.2d at 735.
Id.
93
121 F.2d 752 (9th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 688 (1941).
94
382 F.2d 514 (7th Cir. 1967).
95
In re Cordis Corp., 769 F.2d at 736-37 (discussing Phillips, 121 F.2d 752; Univ.
of Ill. Found. v. Channel Master, 382 F.2d 514 (7th Cir. 1967)).
96
Id. at 736 (quoting Phillips, 121 F.2d 752).
97
Id.
92

98

Id. at 737 (citing Channel Master, 382 F.2d 514).
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defendant does its business in that district through a
permanent and continuous presence there and not . . .
whether it has a fixed physical presence in the sense of
a formal office or store. 99
The court then concluded that the record in the Cordis Corp. case
“indicates that a rational and substantial legal argument may be made
in support of the court’s order denying Cordis’ motion to dismiss.” 100
To summarize, in general terms, as suggested by the Cordis
court, the pre-VE Holding case law relied upon by courts suggest that
a corporate defendant’s regular and established place of business is the
place where it does business “through a permanent and continuous
presence” in the district, although “a fixed physical presence in the
sense of a formal office or store” is not required. 101
As the Supreme Court concluded earlier in Fourco Glass, and
as other courts thereafter recognized, “merely doing business” in the
district is not sufficient. 102 That said, several courts have suggested
that, even if a fixed physical presence is not required, there must
nonetheless be some physical presence in the district. 103 Indeed, even

99

Id.
In re Cordis Corp., 769 F.2d at 737.
101 Id.; see also Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Johnson & Johnson Prod., Inc., No. CIV. 486-359, 1987 WL 10997, at *3-5 (D. Minn. Jan. 2, 1987); Instrumentation Specialties Co. v.
Waters Assocs., Inc., No. 76 C 4340, 1977 WL 22810, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 12, 1977). Courts
have also concluded that presence at periodic trade shows is not sufficient. See, e.g., KnappMonarch Co. v. Casco Prod. Corp., 342 F.2d 622, 625 (7th Cir. 1965) (“[T]he [trade] show
itself may have been a semiannual event and thus ‘regular’ in that sense, [Defendant’s]
participation in it constituted a temporary presence in Chicago rather than a regular and
established place where one could transact business with the defendant from day to day and
from month to month.”); Phillips, 121 F.2d at 756 (explaining defendant operated infringing
apparatus at sites of various customers on a job basis: “the necessary element of permanency
is lacking”); Id. (noting further where appellees “merely conduct precooling operations in a
box car temporarily standing at a railroad siding, which car is there one day and gone the
next . . . . The Standard Fruit Company’s establishment was just a location for a ‘particular
transaction’; the necessary element of permanency is lacking.”).
102 Fourco Glass Co., 353 U.S. at 226; see, e.g., Holub Indus., Inc. v. Wyche, 290 F.2d 852,
854 (4th Cir. 1961) (“The jurisdictional provisions of the federal statutes as thus interpreted
must of course take precedence over the provisions of the process statutes of South Carolina
however the latter may be regarded in the courts of that state.”).
103 See, e.g., Michod v. Walker Magnetics Grp., Inc., 115 F.R.D. 345, 347 (N.D. Ill. 1987)
(“Courts have consistently held that an alleged patent infringer has a ‘regular and established
place of business’ in a judicial district only if it actually has a place of business there; activities
such as the maintenance of independent sales agents, visits by company representatives, and
the solicitation of orders are not enough.” (citing Dual Mfg. & Eng’g, Inc. v. Burris Indus.,
Inc., 531 F.2d 1382, 1386-88 (7th Cir. 1976); Grantham v. Challenge-Cook Bros., Inc., 420
F.2d 1182, 1184-85 (7th Cir.1969))).
100
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registering as a foreign corporation for service of process within a
state, while that would constitute doing business for the purposes of
personal jurisdiction, is not sufficient to establish a regular and
established place of business. 104 It is these general principles, then,
which would likely continue to form the basis of a general test should
the Supreme Court rule in TC Heartland’s favor.
B. Recurring Fact Patterns
As discussed previously, as one of the leading patent law
treatises notes, many of the pre-VE Holding cases focusing on what
constitutes a regular and established place of business in the context
of 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) fall into regular categories of recurring fact
patterns. 105 Unsurprisingly, these fact patterns relate closely to what
factors courts found relevant or irrelevant to the regular and
established place of business determination. 106 Chisum identifies these
four recurring fact patterns as: (1) the “Traveling Salesman Cases;” (2)
the “Sales Office Cases;” (3) the “Independent Sales Representative
Cases;” and (4) the “Parent and Subsidiary Corporations—Separate
Divisions Cases.” 107 These recurring patterns in fact capture many of
the regular and established place of business cases, and are useful in
understanding the sorts of cases that raised this test as an issue in
deciding patent venue questions before VE Holding. 108 Those fact
patterns generally followed the following sorts of structures:
1. The Traveling Salesman Cases
In the Traveling Salesman fact pattern, the defendant’s only
connection with the foreign district is through a traveling salesman,
who does not operate from a fixed physical location, who solicits
orders that are forwarded outside the district to be acknowledged and
fulfilled elsewhere. 109 Courts generally concluded that such limited
contacts with the foreign districts were not sufficient to meet the
104

See, e.g., Johnston v. IVAC Corp., 681 F. Supp. 959, 964 (D. Mass. 1987) (“The fact that
[the Defendant] is registered as a foreign corporation in Massachusetts is of no import, for
mere ‘doing business’ in Massachusetts is not enough to satisfy the pertinent venue statute.”).
105 8 CHISUM, supra note 22, § 21.02.
106 See, e.g., infra notes 145-58 and accompanying text.
107 8 CHISUM, supra note 22, § 21.02.
108 8 CHISUM, supra note 22, § 21.02.
109

8 CHISUM, supra note 22, § 21.02.

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol33/iss3/3

18

Pepe and Brenner: Patent Venue in the Internet Age

2017

PATENT VENUE IN THE INTERNET AGE

693

requirement that defendants have a regular and established place of
business in those districts. 110 So, for example, in American Cyanamid
Co. v. NOPCO Chem. Co., 111 the Fourth Circuit found no regular and
established place of business for a defendant in the Western District of
Virginia where the defendant NOPCO employed in West Virginia a
Regional Sales Manager, who supervised four salesmen operating over
a ten-state area and who maintained, without NOPCO’s knowledge, a
home office in which he stored brochures. 112 Similarly, in University
of Illinois Foundation v. Channel Master Corp.,113 discussed supra,
the Seventh Circuit found that Channel Master did not have a regular
and established place of business in Illinois where Channel Master’s
single employee “use[d] his home in that district as a base for his sales
activities,” but did not keep stock there, and “[a]ll orders from
customers in the district are accepted in New York. All shipments to
customers are made from New York. All payments for goods are made
to New York.” 114And similarly too, in Johnson & Johnson v.
Picard, 115 the Sixth Circuit found that a Philadelphia defendant had no
regular and established place of business in North Carolina simply
because the defendant had only a salesman in North Carolina who
solicited orders in North Carolina, South Carolina, and part of Virginia
and forwarded all orders to Philadelphia for acceptance. 116
Of course, even though this was the general rule, the Federal
Circuit’s decision in In re Cordis Corp. (a case that dealt more
specifically with a sales office rather than a traveling sales force) at
least opened the door for district courts, in certain circumstances, to
find even the presence of traveling salesmen sufficient to meet the
requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b). 117

110

8 CHISUM, supra note 22, § 21.02.
388 F.2d 818 (4th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 906 (1968).
112
Id. at 819-20.
113
382 F.2d 514 (7th Cir. 1967).
114
Id. at 515-16.
115
282 F.2d 386 (6th Cir. 1960).
116
Id. at 388.
111

117 See, e.g., In re Cordis Corp., 769 F.2d 733 (Fed. Cir. 1985); see also Minnesota Mining &
Mfg. Co., 1987 WL 10997, at *3 (“[U]ndue focus on the existence of an office with defendant’s
name on the door ignores economic realities and invites manipulation of venue.”); ShelterLite, Inc. v. Reeves Bros., 356 F. Supp. 189, 195 (N.D. Ohio 1973) (“In this Court’s opinion,
an unyielding rule that a regular and established place of business cannot arise by virtue of a
salesman operating out of his residence is at odds with the practicalities and necessities of the
business community.”).
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2. The Sales Office Cases
In the Sales Office fact pattern, the defendant’s contact with the
foreign district is through maintenance of a sales office solely for the
purpose of soliciting and forwarding orders. 118 Just as with the
Traveling Salesmen cases, courts in Sales Office cases generally
concluded that such limited contacts with the foreign districts were not
sufficient to meet the requirement that defendants have a regular and
established place of business in those districts. 119 In part, this was as
a result of the Supreme Court’s 1915 decision in W.S. Tyler Co. v.
Ludlow-Saylor Wire Co. 120 In that case, the Court concluded in an
extremely short opinion that a Missouri corporation which
manufactured screens in St. Louis did not have a regular and
established place of business in New York. 121 The plaintiff had argued
to the contrary, pointing out that the defendant had employed (on
salary and commission) an “Eastern representative” in New York as a
salesman, and that this representative maintained a room in New York
he used as the headquarters of both defendant and another company he
was representing and solicited orders for wire screens and forwarded
those orders to St. Louis for execution. 122 Given the shortness of the
Supreme Court’s opinion, it was not clear whether the Court’s decision
turned on the salesman’s lack of authority to accept orders, sharing of
the headquarters between two companies, or simultaneous
representation of more than one corporation. 123 That said, courts
regularly found that there was no regular and established place of
business when an office or representative was shared by more than one
company, 124 when the salesman paid for his office or showroom
himself, 125 or when the salesman’s only responsibility with orders was
to forward them out of the district to the defendant company. 126
118

See 14D CHARLES A. WRIGHT, ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE JURISDICTION §
3823 (4th ed. 2011).
119 Id.
120 236 U.S. 723 (1915).
121 Id. at 725.
122 Id.
123 Id.
124 See, e.g., Frink Co. v. Erikson, 20 F.2d 707 (1st Cir. 1927).
125 See, e.g., Erickson v. Emerson, 40 F. Supp. 844 (S.D.N.Y. 1941); Clearasite Headware,
Inc., 204 F. Supp. 4 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
126 See, e.g., Gen. Radio Co. v. Superior Elec. Co., 293 F.2d 949, 950 (1st Cir. 1961) (finding
no regular and established place of business in Massachusetts for a Connecticut company
where the company maintains a salesman in Massachusetts who “has no authority to
acknowledge or accept” orders, and instead forwards them to Connecticut, “which is the only
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3. The Independent Sales Representative Cases
In the Independent Sales Representative fact pattern, the
defendant’s contact with the foreign district is through distribution in
the district of products through an independent representative or
agent. 127 With this fact pattern, once again, courts generally concluded
that such limited contacts with the foreign districts were not sufficient
to meet the requirement that defendants have a regular and established
place of business in those districts. 128 Representative of such cases is
Grantham v. Challenge-Cook Bros., Inc., 129 in which the Seventh
Circuit concluded that there was no regular and established place of
business in Illinois for a California maker of industrial laundry dryers
whose products were distributed in Illinois by a third party, upon
whom the complaint was served. 130 As the court explained in
analyzing the claim:
Washburn Machinery’s distributorship of ChallengeCook dryers in the district is non-exclusive as to both
area and product line. Washburn maintains its own
service department and will service Challenge-Cook
dryers. It carries ‘at least a few parts’ for the
Challenge-Cook dryers and can get others ‘quite fast’
from a Challenge-Cook plant in Ohio. Challenge-Cook
maintains some control over its distributors in that it
reserves
the
right
to
terminate
the
distributorship. Washburn arranges a sale of a
Challenge-Cook dryer with a purchaser in the Northern
District of Illinois and sends a purchase order to
Challenge-Cook in California. Challenge-Cook then
ships the dryer either to the purchaser or to Washburn
as Washburn directs. It invoices Washburn for the sale
price less a percentage discount. The purchaser pays

place where the order can be acknowledged and accepted”); Hoegger v. F.H. Lawson & Co.,
35 F.2d 219, 220 (S.D.N.Y. 1929) (finding no regular and established place of business in
New York for an Ohio company that employs a salesman who “is not authorized to and does
not consummate sales”).
127 See Cordis Corp. v. Cardiac Pacemakers, 599 F.2d. 1085, 1086-87 (1st Cir. 1979).
128 Id. at 1087.
129 420 F.2d 1182 (7th Cir. 1969).
130 Id. at 1186.
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Washburn. Washburn has available catalogues and
literature which display the Challenge-Cook name. 131
While this was the general rule, courts made exceptions and instead
found that defendants did have regular and established places of
business—when the defendants had greater control of the
“independent” sales representatives than was the case in Grantham. 132
4. The Parent and Subsidiary Corporations Cases
In the Parent and Subsidiary Corporation fact pattern, the
defendant’s contact with the foreign district is through control of (or
control by) a parent or subsidiary corporation. 133 In these cases, in
keeping with the Supreme Court’s general guidance regarding the
importance of corporate formalities in keeping parents and subsidiaries
separate, 134 courts generally found that foreign defendants which
merely had subsidiaries in districts did not themselves have regular and
established places of business in the target districts. 135 So, for
example, in L.D. Schreiber Cheese Co. v. Clearfield Co., 136 the court
found that the parent defendant H.P. Hood Co. did not have a regular
and established place of business in the Western District of
Pennsylvania, even though its wholly owned subsidiary, Clearfield
Cheese Company, was located there. 137 In concluding that patent
venue was not proper for H.P. Hood, the court conceded that “there is
some overlap of officers and directors . . . “that Hood provides
Clearfield with marketing assistance and sets quality control standards
for Clearfield,” that the two companies were represented by the same
counsel, and that “one employee of Clearfield does not consider Hood
to be an outside company.” 138 “On the other hand,” the court added,
the two companies maintained separate bank accounts and paid
131

Id. at 1184.
See, e.g., Davis v. Motive Parts Corp., 16 F.2d 148 (S.D.N.Y. 1922) (finding regular and
established place of business in New York for Wisconsin company where the distributor dealt
exclusively in products of defendant, even though the distributor was not able to bind the
defendant company).
133 See generally Pfizer Inc. v. Mylan Inc., 201 F. Supp. 3d 483 (D. Del. 2016).
134 See, e.g., Cannon Mfg. Co. v. Cudahy Co., 267 U.S. 333 (1925) (holding that service on a
foreign corporation cannot be obtained through service on a wholly owned subsidiary provided
that there is real corporate separation between the parent and the subsidiary).
135 Brunswick Corp. v. Suzuki Motor Co., Ltd. 575 F. Supp. 1412, 1424 (E.D. Wis. 1983).
136 495 F. Supp. 313 (W.D. Pa. 1980).
137 Id. at 317.
138 Id. at 318-19.
132
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separate taxes, have separate officers and directors, and “are treated as
separate entities for accounting purposes.” 139 “[V]enue,” the court
ultimately concluded, “is proper with respect to a parent corporation
only when that parent has disregarded all but the formalities of
separation in its dealings with its subsidiaries.” 140
In contrast, where the facts demonstrated a different
relationship between the parent and subsidiary, courts generally found
that, where the controlling defendant corporation ignored corporate
formalities, and treated the subsidiary as part of the parent, the
subsidiaries did count as regular and established places of business for
the defendant corporations. 141 So, for example, the court in State
Indus., Inc. v. Mor-Flo Indus., Inc. 142 concluded that an in-district
subsidiary, American Appliance Manufacturing Corporation, was, in
effect, “part and parcel” of defendant Mor-Flo Industries, where:
Research and development, manufacturing, marketing
and management of Mor-Flo and American appear to
be inextricably intertwined. American is completely
dominated in its operations by its parent, Mor-Flo
acting through its officers and directors. Mor-Flo not
only completely owns American, but it completely
controls American such that American has no ‘separate
mind, will or existence of its own.’ 143
And, following the same logic, the courts also generally concluded that
a defendant corporation had a regular and established place of business
in a district where the defendant unquestionably had a corporate
division in the district, even if the alleged infringing activity was
139

Id. at 319.
Id. at 318; see also Technograph Printed Circuits, Ltd. v. Epsco, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 260,
264 (E.D. Pa. 1963) (“There is not present in the instant case the immediate and direct
intervention in the subsidiary’s affairs and transactions . . . to be sufficient to fuse parent and
subsidiary.”); Shapiro v. Ford Motor Co., 359 F. Supp. 350, 356 (D. Md. 1973) (explaining
that a subsidiary corporation was not alter ego of parent, and so it did not give rise to venue
for the parent in the district under 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b)).
141 See generally State Indus., Inc. v. Mor-Flo Indus., Inc., No. CIV-2-84-276, 1986 WL 87793
(E.D. Tenn. May 29, 1986).
142 Id.
143 Id. at *1; see also, e.g., Am. Can Co. v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., Inc., 433 F. Supp. 333,
336 (E.D. Wis. 1977) (explaining a subsidiary constitutes regular and established place of
business for parent where there was an “intermingling of corporate identities in the day-to-day
operations” of the parent); Stanley Works v. Globemaster, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 1325, 1332 (D.
Mass. 1975) (finding venue in district of subsidiary for parent where “[c]loser examination of
its activities reveals, however, a carefully-sewn web of interrelationships and interdependence
between parent and subsidiary making its individual identity more apparent than real.”).
140
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committed by an entirely separate division that was not located in the
district. 144
C. Relevant and Irrelevant Factors
Even if it is true, as the District of Minnesota noted in 1958,
that “no reliable test has been devised by which a court can determine
whether or not a foreign corporation maintains a regular and
established place of business within any certain District,” 145 it is also
true that the general principles and broad tests and the recurring fact
patterns, all discussed above, 146 together identify numerous nonexhaustive and intertwined factors that are or were all relevant to courts
in the pre-Internet age considering what in each case constituted a
regular and established place of business. 147 Among these nonexhaustive and non-determinative factors are: (1) whether the
defendant owned or rented facilities in the district; 148 (2) whether the
defendant consummated sales or maintained a stock of goods in the

144

See, e.g., Joslyn Mfg. Co. v. Amerace Corp., 729 F. Supp. 1219, 1223 (N.D. Ill. 1990)
(“[A]ny corporate division, not necessarily the division accused of infringing the patent, meets
the statutory requirement.” (citing Gaddis v. Calgon Corp., 449 F.2d 1318, 1320 (5th
Cir.1971))).
145 Up-Right, Inc., 165 F. Supp. at 744.
146 See supra notes 68-145 and accompanying text.
147 But see Brevel Prod. Corp., 202 F. Supp. at 829 (warning that “[i]t is not simply a matter
of numerical accumulation of factors. Courts have often recognized many or most of the
above factors as being present, and yet declined to accept jurisdiction”).
148 See, e.g., IPCO Hosp. Supply Corp. (Whaledent Int’l Div.) v. Les Fils D’Auguste Maillefer
S.A., 446 F. Supp. 206, 208 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (finding no regular and established place of
business where defendant “does not own, lease or control any place of business or ‘physical
location’ within the Southern District of New York”); Watsco, Inc. v. Henry Valve Co., 232
F. Supp. 38, 47 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) (finding a regular and established place of business for Illinois
company in New York where the company leased a New York office which had the defendant
company’s name on the door, which was staffed by a full-time stenographer and was under
the supervision of a sales manager who also occupied the office on a full-time basis); Shelton,
131 F.2d at 806 (7th Cir. 1942) (finding a regular and established place of business where a
company rented an office, with its name on the door, in Chicago, and the lease called for
payment of rent by the defendant for “an office for said company’s business”); Hazeltine Corp.
v. Yellow Taxi Corp., 6 F. Supp. 813, 813 (E.D.N.Y. 1934) (finding a regular and established
place of business in E.D.N.Y. where the S.D.N.Y. defendant corporation leased two garages
in E.D.N.Y. at which it housed much of its taxi fleet and kept staff and employees); Scott &
Williams v. Hemphill Co., 14 F. Supp. 621, 622 (S.D.N.Y. 1931) (finding a regular and
established place of business in New York where a Rhode Island corporation rented a New
York showroom in the charge of a sales representative and secretary and the corporation
identified the showroom as a “branch office”).
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district; 149 (3) whether the defendant paid employees’ salaries or paid
for office expenses in the foreign district; 150 (4) whether the defendant
had company names listed in telephone or other directories; 151 and (5)
whether the defendant controlled sales agencies or subsidiary
corporations in the foreign district. 152
149

See, e.g., Werner Mach. Co. v. Nat’l Cooperatives, Inc., 289 F. Supp. 962, 964 (E.D. Wis.
1968) (finding a regular and established place of business for defendant in Wisconsin where
the defendant’s employee in Wisconsin “does more than solicit business; he has the authority
to and does complete sales”); Fed. Elec. Prod. Co. v. Frank Adam Elec. Co., 100 F. Supp. 8,
11 (S.D.N.Y. 1951) (finding “a regular and established place of business” where defendant
owned a building in New York “which it uses to stockpile its products”); Philad Co. v. Nat’l
Mineral Co., 14 F. Supp. 625, 625 (S.D.N.Y. 1936) (finding a regular and established place of
business in New York where “it is evident that the New York office is more than an outlying
post for soliciting orders. A line of the defendant’s products is kept there and is
demonstrated. A substantial stock of merchandise is kept there, and sales of spare parts and
accessories are made there, customers taking delivery and making cash payment in the
office.”); Am. Sales Book Co. v. Atl. Register Co., 14 F. Supp. 623, 624 (S.D.N.Y. 1934)
(suggesting that the determinative reason a Massachusetts defendant had a regular and
established place of business in New York was because the New York office was used for
“more than mere soliciting of sales. The defendant kept a stock of goods in it for
demonstration purposes. Occasional sales from this stock were made at the office. At least
one delivery of a writing device was made from the office.”).
150 See, e.g., Urquhart v. Am.-La France Foamite Corp., 144 F.2d 542, 543 (D.C. Cir. 1944)
(fidning a regular and established place of business where defendant “maintains an office in
the District. Its name is displayed on the door and listed in the telephone directory. The office
force consists of a manager, a stenographer and two salesmen. The salesmen not only take
orders for the defendant’s products in the District but also in neighboring states.”); Briggs v.
Fram Corp., 272 F. Supp. 185, 186 (N.D. Ill. 1967) (finding a regular and established place of
business where defendant “pays all the expenses of the zone sales office, including secretary’s
wages, telephone, telegraph and other office expenses and insurance [and where] [s]ix district
sales managers and two engineers, all full time employees of [defendant], work out of the zone
office”); Ronson Art Metal Works v. Brown & Bigelow, 104 F. Supp. 716, 724 (S.D.N.Y.
1952) (finding a regular and established place of business in New York where the defendant’s
vice-president in charge of its eastern sales division “has his headquarters within this district
and performs here such executive
functions as supervision of district sales
managers, territory alignment, sales planning,
manpower management and
recommendations on hiring and firing salesmen . . . . Other salaried personnel of defendant
handling special sales, recruiting of personnel and field sales training operate from within this
district”).
151 See, e.g., In re Cordis Corp., 769 F.2d at 735 (finding a regular and established place of
business where the “Minneapolis telephone directory includes Cordis’ name and telephone
number and lists the address of the secretarial service as Cordis’ address”); Urquhart, 144 F.2d
at 543 (finding a regular and established place of business where defendant’s “name is
displayed on the door and listed in the telephone directory”); Shelton, 131 F.2d at 806 (finding
a regular and established place of business where a company rented an office, with its name
on the door, in Chicago); Watsco, Inc., 232 F. Supp. at 47 (finding a regular and established
place of business for Illinois company in New York where the New York office had the
defendant company’s name on the door).
152 See, e.g., Thomson-Houston Elec. Co. v. Bullock Elec. Co., 101 F. 587, 589 (C.C.S.D.N.Y.
1900) (finding a regular and established place of business in New York for Ohio company
where the Ohio defendant controlled sales by a New York affiliate), aff’d in part, rev’d in part
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Moreover, just as there are (or were, pre-VE Holding) relevant
factors for considering whether there is a regular and established place
of business, there are other factors that the courts have deemed
irrelevant to this question. The most important or universal, which
was derived from a 1915 Supreme Court decision, is that merely
soliciting orders—by itself—within a judicial district is not sufficient
to show that the defendant has a regular and established place of
business. 153 Courts have also concluded that there is no regular and
established place of business where: (1) a defendant maintains an
office in the foreign district but staffs the office with salesmen who
work on commission or forward all orders for goods to defendant,
outside the district, to be fulfilled; 154 (2) the defendant retains
employees in a foreign district who work solely out of their home
offices; 155 (3) defendants employ traveling salesmen who travel

sub nom. Thomson-Houston Elec. Co. v. Nassau Elec. R. Co., 107 F. 277 (2d Cir. 1901);
Leach Co. v. Gen. Sani-Can Mfg. Corp., 393 F.2d 183, 186 (7th Cir. 1968) (finding a regular
and established place of business for New York company in Illinois based on the operations
of subsidiary in Illinois where “the corporate form of [Defendant’s] Midwest operation was
the sheerest of shells to cloak his real agency . . . .”).
153 W.S. Tyler Co. v. Ludlow-Saylor Wire Co., 236 U.S. 723, 725 (1915); see also Werner
Mach. Co. v. Nat’l Cooperatives, Inc., 289 F. Supp. 962, 964 (E.D. Wis. 1968); Brevel Prod.
Corp., 202 F. Supp. at 829 (finding no regular and established place of business in New York
where the orders for defendant’s products were solicited by an independent sales
representative in New York).
154 See, e.g., W.S. Tyler Co., 236 U.S. at 725; Gen. Radio Co., 293 F.2d at 950 (finding no
regular and established place of business in Massachusetts for a Connecticut company where
the company maintains a salesman in Massachusetts who “has no authority to acknowledge or
accept” orders, and instead forwards them to Connecticut, “which is the only place where the
order can be acknowledged and accepted”); Morse v. Master Specialties Co., 239 F. Supp.
641, 642 (D.N.J. 1964) (finding no regular and established place of business for California
company in New Jersey where the California company maintained a New Jersey office, which
was closed before the litigation, but the office was staffed with two engineers who “were
employed in the New Jersey office to solicit business no orders were accepted or rejected in
New Jersey but were all transmitted directly to the California offices for approval and
shipment”); Hoegger v. F.H. Lawson & Co., 35 F.2d 219, 220 (S.D.N.Y. 1929) (finding no
regular and established place of business in New York for an Ohio company that employs a
salesman who “is not authorized to and does not consummate sales”).
155 See, e.g., Grantham v. Challenge-Cook Bros., 420 F.2d 1182, 1185 (7th Cir. 1969) (finding
no regular and established place of business in Illinois where the regional sales manager lived
in Illinois and occasionally worked out of his home, but “he was free to live where he chose
so far as [Defendant] was concerned,” and “Plaintiffs’ proofs failed to show what, if any, use
Schmidt made of his home in connection with his employment”); Railex Corp. v. White Mach.
Co., 243 F. Supp. 381, 385 (E.D.N.Y. 1965) (finding no regular and established place of
business in E.D.N.Y. where the New Jersey defendant’s salesman occasionally worked from
his home on Long Island); Up-Right, Inc., 165 F. Supp. at 744.
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through and work in a foreign district; 156 (4) defendants have
franchises in foreign districts; 157 or (5) defendants participate in trade
shows in foreign districts. 158
V.

APPLYING OLD CASE LAW TO CHANGED CIRCUMSTANCES
IN THE INTERNET AGE

Now that the Supreme Court has accepted TC Heartland’s
argument, and in doing so has strengthened the import of 28 U.S.C. §
1400(b) to venue determinations in patent cases, it will likely once
again become necessary for courts to determine what constitutes a
“regular and established place of business.” But, as noted previously,
the changed circumstances of the Internet Age from the business world
of the 1940s-1980s suggest that there could be some significant
problems with attempting to fit modern fact patterns into historical
examples, or even with applying more general principles or broad tests
formulated in that earlier period to facts as they exist today. Put
another way, the world of the 1920s-1980s is not a perfect fit with the
world of the 2010s, and trying to shoehorn modern technologies into
decades-old case law might in some cases inappropriately expand
patent venue beyond what the statute says or what Congress
intended. Without attempting to be exhaustive, below we briefly
discuss three specific fact patterns of new ways of doing business in
the Internet Age that highlight these concerns: (1) the Uber model; (2)
the telecommuting model; and (3) the web services/server farm model.

156 See, e.g., Johnson & Johnson v. Picard, 282 F.2d 386, 388 (6th Cir. 1960) (finding no
regular and established place of business in North Carolina for Philadelphia defendant whose
salesman in North Carolina solicits orders in North Carolina, South Carolina, and part of
Virginia and forwards all orders to Philadelphia for acceptance).
157 See, e.g., Rains v. Cascade Indus., Inc., 258 F. Supp. 974, 975 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (finding no
regular and established place of business in New York for New Jersey company that
manufactured swimming pools where the New York corporation selling the pools was
operating under a franchise).
158 See, e.g., Mastantuono, 184 F. Supp. at 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) (“Something more is
required.”); L. E. Waterman Co v. Parker Pen Co., 100 F. 544, 544 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1900)
(finding no regular and established place of business in Pennsylvania for Wisconsin defendant
that merely “occupied a space in the recent National Export Exposition in the city of
Philadelphia as an exhibitor of merchandise”); Knapp-Monarch Co., 342 F.2d at 625 (finding
no regular and established place of business for defendant in Chicago where defendant was
merely participating in a semiannual trade show).
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A. Unchanged and Current Business Structures and
Practices
As an initial matter, even though the world of the 2010s is
vastly different from the world of the 1980s, much less the 1920s, it is
certainly true that many business practices have nonetheless remained
constant. 159 So, for example, there would likely be no problem with
courts addressing what constitutes a regular and established place of
business applying pre-VE Holding case law where a defendant has a
permanent brick-and-mortar store, a corporate headquarters, or a
manufacturing plant in a particular district. These cases do not even
present close questions: nothing about the changing technological
landscape of the past thirty years has altered what it means to have
such facilities in a district. Prior to VE Holding, all such defendants
would have been judged to have a regular and established place of
business in the district, and it makes sense that courts today would
apply the pre-VE Holding case law to reach the same results. Such
cases could alternatively be decided either by considering the various
factors pre-VE Holding courts considered, by analogizing to a
recurring fact-pattern, or even by applying the broader sort of test
identified by the Federal Circuit in In re Cordis Corp. 160 And, indeed,
every company with this sort of business in the relevant district would
certainly meet the Cordis Corp. test of doing business in the district
“through a permanent and continuous presence.” 161
B. Abandoned and Obsolete Business Structures and
Practices
On the other hand, because of the vastly different technological
worlds of the 1920s – 1980s and today, other business practices and
structures, including those that helped form the basis for what Chisum
on Patents considered to be regularly recurring fact patterns or what
were regularly factors considered by courts, are now largely or entirely
obsolete or abandoned. As one example, it used to be the case that, to
market their goods, companies needed to depend upon traveling
salesmen. 162 In the modern, Internet-driven age, however, traveling
salesmen
are,
if
not
entirely obsolete,
much
less
159

See generally supra notes 133-44 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., In re Cordis Corp., 769 F.2d 733 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
161 Id. at 737.
162 See, e.g., supra notes 109-17 and accompanying text.
160
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prevalent. 163 Accordingly, the pre-VE Holding traveling salesmen
cases are far less relevant to how business is conducted today than they
would have been decades ago. As another example, courts engaged in
the regular and established place of business analysis regularly
considered whether defendant corporations were listed in telephone
directories. 164 But again, in the Internet Age where all it takes is a
quick Google search to find a company’s contact information,
telephone directories are antiquated and nearly or entirely obsolete,
and so this factor should no longer be relevant one way or the other.
It could be argued that such cases and considerations could be
used to analogize to more modern issues. For example, the traveling
salesmen of the 1920s – 1980s could conceivably be like Internetbased sales today, and the telephone directories of the 1950s – 1980s
could conceivably be like listings on mapping programs or search
engines today. But such analogies, while intellectually interesting,
seem strained, and are likely not the best ways to reach determination
on what 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) means when it lays out the requirements
for venue in patent infringement actions.
1. The Uber Model
The Uber Model refers to an app-driven business model, in
which a company is located in one physical location, but employs or
contracts with individuals elsewhere provide services in the company’s
name. 165 So, Uber, which is headquartered in California, contracts
with individual drivers spread throughout the United States and the
world. 166 Those drivers use Uber’s app, running on their smartphones,
to connect with consumers seeking rides from Uber. 167 But imagine
that a patent-holder wants to sue Uber in a district where Uber (1)
provides rides to tens of thousands of passengers each day, (2) does
significant advertising, and (3) receives a significant and consistent
revenue stream, but where Uber does not have an office, does not have
any employees, and retains drivers as independent contractors. A court
163 Laura Linard, Birth of the American Salesman, HARV. BUS. SCH. (Apr. 19, 2004),
http://hbswk.hbs.edu/item/birth-of-the-american-salesman.
164 See, e.g., supra note 151.
165 See generally Farhad Manjoo, Uber’s Business Model Could Change Your Work, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 28, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/29/technology/personaltech/uber-arising-business-model.html?_r=0.
166 Id.
167 Id.
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attempting to determine whether Uber has a regular and established
place of business in that district would clearly have to face questions
not addressed in the pre-VE Holding case law and likely not imagined
by Congress when it passed 28 U.S.C. § 1400. While, as with the cases
of the traveling salesmen and the telephone directories discussed
above, lawyers and judges could once again attempt to analogize from
pre-VE Holding fact patterns and factors to the Uber situation, doing
so would seem to be a stretch and would not clearly yield the right
results under the venue statute. Indeed, in the Uber-model fact pattern
set forth above, it is unclear whether venue would be appropriate. For
example, the lack of a physical presence in the District may suggest
that merely soliciting business in the District through independent
contractors (i.e., Uber drivers) may not be enough.
2. The Telecommuting Model
The Telecommuting Model refers to a model in which a
company’s employees, aided by changes in technology, work from
their homes rather than from a company’s brick and mortar
facility. 168 While in the pre-VE Holding period people could and did
work from home offices, changes in technology have now made it
possible for people to do so seamlessly, without their co-workers,
employers, or customers necessarily knowing. But imagine that a New
Hampshire corporation employs an employee who lives in
Massachusetts, and who (with the company’s permission) regularly
works from his or her home in Massachusetts instead of from the
permanent office in New Hampshire. Or imagine instead that the
employee only works from a Massachusetts home office, and in fact
never works from New Hampshire. Under the pre-VE Holding case
law, courts did consider whether working from a home office
constituted a regular and established place of business. 169 But those
cases were decided in a vastly different context, where working from
a home office had significantly different implications for how a
business operates. And, once again, attempting to analogize between
those very different 1920s–1980s cases and modern telecommuting

168

See generally Jin-Ru Yen & Hani S. Mahmassani, Telecommuting Adoption:
Conceptual Framework and Model Estimation, RESEARCHGATE, (Jan. 1997),
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/245557612_Telecommuting_Adoption_Conceptua
l_Framework_and_Model_Estimation.
169 See, e.g., supra note 155.
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seems strained, and not necessarily the approach that would yield a
correct application of 28 U.S.C. § 1400. Moreover, complicating this
analysis is the fact that determining venue under the Telecommuting
Model is a heavily fact-dependent inquiry that should address, among
other factors, the number of individuals that are telecommunicating
from the District, the nature of the business that each person is doing,
and whether each individual telecommunicated full time or part time.
3. The Web Services/Server Farm Model
The Web Services/Server Farm model refers to a business
model in which a corporation located in one district contracts with
another company (such as Amazon Web Services) to provide all of the
defendant corporation’s computing functionality. 170 Thus, a media
corporation located in New York might contract with Amazon Web
Services, which has offices and servers in Washington state, 171 to
handle all digital storage, financial transactions, and back-end
computing. Imagine, in such a case, that a plaintiff wants to sue the
defendant corporation for patent infringement. Clearly, under 28
U.S.C. § 1400(b) the plaintiff could sue in New York; a much more
difficult question is whether the plaintiff could also sue in Washington,
where the defendant (through its contracts) utilizes physical servers,
and conducts much of its regular business. Again, it might be possible
to analogize between pre-VE Holding case law on sales offices and
providers of web services or server farms, but once again such
analogies feel strained and potentially anachronistic. Nevertheless,
depending on the facts of each case, the presence of servers in a
particular jurisdiction to simply host data and provide some computing
functionality without more may be too tenuous of a connection to make
venue appropriate.
C. Higher-Level Principles and Broad Tests
The discussion above lays out just a few ways to think about
analogizing how business is conducted in the Internet Age to how
business was conducted in the twentieth century for the purposes of
170

See Server Farm, WEBOPEDIA, http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/S/server_farm.html
(last visited April 29, 2017).
171 See generally Ingrid Burrington, Why Amazon’s Data Centers are Hidden in Spy Country,
ATLANTIC (Jan. 8, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2016/01/ amazonweb-services-data-center/423147/.
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determining whether a defendant has a “regular and established place
of business” within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b). Again, while
it can be an interesting intellectual exercise to do so, it is not clear that
analogizing in this fashion will generate decisions that appropriately
correspond to what the statute means when it refers to regular and
established places of business. The truth is that Congress in enacting
28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) could not possibly have had in mind even old
technology, such as ATMs, 172 much less technology such as
smartphones, server farms, or concepts such as social media. That
these technologies would have been (in the Supreme Court’s words)
“nearly inconceivable” 173 to courts deciding pre-VE Holding cases
suggests that attempting to analogize to cases with allegedly similar
facts is not the most appropriate way to address questions of what
constitutes a “regular and established place of business.”
Further, while it is possible to distill some higher-level
governing principles from the collection of pre-VE Holding cases, it is
not clear that applying such principles in this context would yield any
better results. As noted previously, in general terms, in order to have
a regular and established place of business, a corporation must have a
continuous (although not necessarily fixed) presence in the district,
must conduct regular, continuous business, and must exercise some
control over that business. 174 As demonstrated in the few fact patterns
or models above, attempting to apply even this very broad test to the
Uber model, the Telecommuting model, or the Web Services model
would raise difficult questions that were likely never intended to be
addressed by 28 U.S.C. § 1400.
1. A Restrained Approach
As the above discussion demonstrates, the Internet Age is
different enough from the world of the 1920s – 1980s that it is difficult
to analogize directly between circumstances in the pre-VE Holding
172

Indeed, the first time Congress appears to have considered the import of ATMs was in the
2011 America Invents Act, when Congress included a provision creating an “ATM exemption
for venue purposes,” dictating that “In an action for infringement under section 281 of title 35,
United States Code, of a covered business method patent, an automated teller machine shall
not be deemed to be a regular and established place of business for purposes of section 1400(b)
. . . .” Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 18, 125 Stat. 284 (Sept. 16,
2011).
173 Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2484.
174 See, e.g., In re Cordis Corp., 769 F.2d at 737; Dual Mfg. & Eng’g, Inc., 531 F.2d at 138788.
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business environment and the business environment today. Put
another way, while some methods of doing business have remained
constant, and are easily subject to pre-VE Holding law, other ways of
doing business are so novel and so new that it is hard to draw direct
analogies or to say how cases should come out in light of that law.
That said, this conclusion does not mean courts attempting to
determine what constitutes a regular and established place of business
should not look to pre-VE Holding law. Now that TC Heartland has
prevailed at the Supreme Court, courts will have to do exactly that, as
this case law appears, once again, to be binding precedent. And in
many cases, applying pre-VE Holding law and analogizing to pre-VE
Holding fact patterns is likely to achieve good results, and correctly
determine what constitutes a regular and established place of business
under 28 U.S.C. § 1400. But what this Article has demonstrated is
that, at least in some cases, applying pre-VE Holding law to the Internet
Age and analogizing to pre-VE Holding fact patterns may not achieve
good or correct results. In those cases, where the methods of doing
business are too new, too web-driven, or too incomparable to the
methods of doing business of the 1920s–1980s, courts should take a
restrained approach instead of blithely applying all pre-VE Holding
law. Put another way: when faced with these novel situations, courts
should consider simply finding that 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) was not
intended to reach these unusual circumstances, and so there is no
regular and established place of business in the district where Uber’s
independent contractors pick up passengers, where employees
telecommute seamlessly from home offices, or where a company
leases time on Amazon’s servers. 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) is a special
venue statute drafted by Congress; when faced with these sorts of fact
patterns, courts should consider whether to hold off on analogizing to
pre-VE Holding case law, and let Congress determine whether it
wishes to amend § 1400(b) to address the Internet Age.
V.

CONCLUSION

As discussed above, TC Heartland’s victory will likely have
significant effects on how and where patent plaintiffs can bring
infringement actions, and will almost certainly reduce substantially the
importance of the Eastern District of Texas as a venue for patent
litigation. In this Article, we have examined how TC Heartland’s win
will revitalize an old question—what constitutes a “regular and
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established place of business” under 28 U.S.C. § 1400. And we have
specifically argued that TC Heartland’s win will raise concerns about
courts potentially applying case law addressing obsolete or dated
business structures and circumstances to the vastly different business
structures of the Internet Age.
This said, when we began this Article, the Court had not yet
issued an opinion in TC Heartland. While, now that it has issued its
opinion, it is clear that the specific issue of what constitutes a regular
and established place of business under 28 U.S.C. § 1400 is, once
again, relevant. Had TC Heartland lost, then much of the discussion
above would have obviously been less relevant to courts considering
where venue lies for patent infringement actions. But the argument we
are making in this Article is not solely limited to the context of this
case, or this dispute. Indeed, even if TC Heartland had lost, our
broader point would have remained the same: in an explosively
changing world, courts today should at the very least be cautious when
relying on, applying, or analogizing to cases decided in a vastly
different time and context, and under factual scenarios that were not
(or could not be) contemplated. Lawyers and judges are certainly
intellectually capable of analogizing across different historical periods,
but doing so raises the question of whether such analogies are useful
or meaningful except as intellectual exercises. And the question that
courts should consider in such cases is exactly when and whether
engaging in this sort of analysis is truly the best way to reach correct
judgments.
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